

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 061310Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4349

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 16896

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, UR

SUBJ: NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS CONSULTATIONS - VERBATIM REPORT OF NOV 5
PLENARY, MESSAGE NUMBER EIGHT

1. VERBATIM REPORT OF NOV 5 PLENARY FOLLOWS: QUOTE:

STOESSEL: GOOD AFTERNOON, MR. MINISTER. IT IS MY UNDER-
STANDING THAT YOU ARE TO CHAIR TODAY'S MEETING.

MOROKHOV: MR. AMBASSADOR, I AM THE CHAIRMAN TODAY AND MAY I TURN THE
FLOOR
OVER TO YOU. WE ARE IN OUR USUAL GOOD SPIRIT TODAY.

STOESSEL: THANK YOU, MR. MINISTER. WE ARE PREPARED AND IF
YOU PREFER WILL BEGIN WITH OUR STATEMENT.

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IN THESE
CONSULTATIONS IS TO REACH AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WITH
YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF THE SMALL CONFERENCE
OF KEY NUCLEAR EXPORTERS THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED. IT
WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE
ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT
AND THE OTHER KEY EXPORTERS, IF WE CAN QUICKLY AGREE
IN PRINCIPLE ON THE CONFERENCE AND ITS BASIC GOAL OF
MULTILATERAL COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES
AMONG KEY EXPORTERS. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY
WASHINGTON THAT THE OTHER KEY EXPORTERS WHICH WE HAVE
IDENTIFIED -- JAPAN, FRANCE, CANADA, THE FRG AND THE

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UK, HAVE BEEN PRESENTED WITH OUR AIDE MEMOIRE ON THIS

SUBJECT. AS WE INDICATED EARLIER, WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF THE STATUS OF THESE OTHER CONSULTATIONS.

AT THIS TIME I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THE FIFTH POINT (PARAGRAPH (3)) OF OUR POSITION PAPER. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE IN SUCH A POLICY WOULD BE TO PREVENT THE ACCUMULATION OF WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIALS IN ESPECIALLY VOLATILE OR SENSITIVE AREAS. TO THAT END OUR CONDITIONS INCLUDED NOT ONLY THE POSSIBLE BUY-BACK OF PLUTONIUM, BUT ALSO THE PROVISION THAT PLUTONIUM REPROCESSING, STORAGE AND FUEL FABRICATION SHOULD BE OUTSIDE THE REGION.

WITH REGARD TO OUR DESCRIPTION OF SPECIAL PROVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH OUR PROPOSED REACTOR SALES TO EGYPT AND ISRAEL, YOU ASKED WHETHER OTHER KEY EXPORTERS COULD BUY THE PLUTONIUM PRODUCED IN THOSE COUNTRIES AND USE IT AT THEIR DISCRETION. OUR POSITION IS THAT THE HANDLING AS WELL AS THE USE OF THIS PLUTONIUM BY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE USUAL SAFEGUARDS AND CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO PLUTONIUM IN SUCH SUPPLIER STATES. THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WHO ARE MAJOR SUPPLIERS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ARE EXPECTED TO HAVE FORMAL NON-PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS COMMITMENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND, IN ADDITION, THE PLUTONIUM ACQUIRED THROUGH IMPLEMENTING SUCH A BUY-BACK PROVISION WOULD REPRESENT ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCED IN THOSE STATES.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTION CONCERNING WHETHER WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE EXPORTED ONLY TO NPT PARTIES. THIS IS A VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM SINCE SEVERAL OF THE KEY EXPORTER COUNTRIES ARE NOT PARTIES TO THIS TREATY. IN ADDITION, SOME OF THESE KEY EXPORTERS ARE UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO ADOPT A STRICT REQUIREMENT OF NPT ADHERENCE ON RECIPIENTS OF ALL NUCLEAR SUPPLY. HOWEVER, ALL OF THESE SUPPLIERS HAVE NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES AND IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT AMONG THE KEY EXPORTERS THAT A FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT TO NPT ADHERENCE SHOULD BE A CONDITION OF SUPPLY FOR AGREED ITEMS OF NUCLEAR

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MATERIALS, TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT.

THUS, WHILE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE AT THIS STAGE TO INSIST ON NPT ADHERENCE, WE HOPE TO ESTABLISH CONCERTED POLICIES WHICH WILL REQUIRE AT A MINIMUM THAT RECIPIENT COUNTRIES MAKE A NON-PROLIFERATION COMMITMENT COMPARABLE TO THE NPT, IN PARTICULAR ARTICLE II OF THAT TREATY, AND THAT THEY ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL OF THEIR PEACEFUL

NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. OTHER CONDITIONS, SUCH AS THOSE WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN CONNECTION WITH PHYSICAL SECURITY AND SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO SENSITIVE REGIONS, ALSO APPEAR DESIRABLE AND SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT OUR PROPOSED SMALL CONFERENCE OF KEY EXPORTERS.

YOU HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS ON OTHER ISSUESRUUCH AS CONFERENCE PROCEDURES AND MULTINATIONAL PLANT OPERATIONS. FURTHER DETAILS OF CONFERENCE PROCEDURES WOULD, OF COURSE, DEPEND ON FOLLOW-UP CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL PROPOSED PARTICIPANTS. MORE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES COULD THEN BE DISCUSSED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.

MR. MINISTER, AS WE HAVE AGREED, WE WILL RECESS THESE CONSULTATIONS TOMORROW. NATURALLY I WILL BE AVAILABLE DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS FOR PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS AND OTHER SUBJECTS. HOWEVER, WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WITH YOU PRIOR TO OUR RECESS, ON OUR APPROACH OF MULTILATERAL COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES INCLUDING A CONFERENCE OF KEY EXPORTERS.

MOROKHOV: THANK YOU FOR YOUR CLARIFICATION WHICH I FIND VERY USEFUL IN UNDERSTANDING YOUR QUESTIONS AND YOUR APPROACH TO THE SMALL CONFERENCE OF KEY EXPORTERS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND TECHNOLOGY. I HAVE TO REPORT ON THE ABOVE TO MY HIGHER AUTHORITIES. I ALSO HAVE TO REPORT ON A WIDER CIRCLE OF QUESTION WE DISCUSSED HERE. SO FAR, THE LACK OF CLARITY HELD ME BACK FROM REPORTING TO MY AUTHORITIES.

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE WAY WE VIEW IT,

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ALL THE QUESTIONS DEALING WITH THE WEAPONS
NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME MUST BE HANDLED BY A
COORDINATING CENTER IN WHICH AT LEAST SOME PEOPLE
WOULD KNOW ALL THE ASPECTS OF WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION
PROBLEM. OF COURSE, ONE CAN DISCUSS SEPARATE
ELEMENTS BUT THE COORDINATION OF ALL QUESTIONS MUST
COME FROM ONE CENTER.

OF COURSE, WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE PRINCIPAL
STAND OF USG ON QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE SOVIET SIDE
SO THAT WE CAN FORM OUR ATTITUDE AND I STRESS THAT WE
WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE ATTITUDES OF USG WITHIN TWO
WEEKS.

TO ILLUSTRATE HOW OUR PRESENT TALKS ARE LINED
TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE, LET ME GIVE YOU ONE
EXAMPLE: EVEN IF THE EXPORTERS' CONFERENCE SHOULD
COME UP WITH A DECISION ON CONTROLS, THE VERIFICATION
PROBLEM WILL BE UP TO IAEA WHICH, SO FAR, IS THE
ONLY RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONAL ORGAN AND CONTROL
APPARATUS TO DEAL WITH NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIP-
MENT FOR NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR STATES. THUS,
THE BURDEN WILL FALL ON THE SHOULDERS OF IAEA WHICH,
AS YOU KNOW, IS IN A VERY UNSATISFACTORY SHAPE. LET
ME GIVE YOU SOME FACTS: FOR SEVERAL YEARS THIS
AGENCY HAS CARRIED OUT SAFEGUARDS INSPECTIONS AND
HAS ACCUMULATED CONSIDERABLE EXPERTISE ON VERIFICATION,
ON PROCESSES, ON DATA COLLECTION AND INSPECTION OF
FACILITIES. THE IAEA HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL FACILITIES
FOR VERIFYING ALL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR PRODUCTION EXCEPT
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FOR URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

MR. AMBASSADOR, THIS DOCUMENT IS A DETAILED
ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN THE AGENCY, BUT I'LL GIVE
YOU ONLY AN ABBRIVATED VERSION TO ILLUSTRATE MY POINT.

WE NOW HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO SEE HOW EFFECTIVE
THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEM OF IAEA REALLY IS AND THAT
MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE FUTURE TO IMPROVE BOTH THE
SAFEGUARDS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS
DEPARTMENT.

AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN PRACTICAL ACTION IS PLAYED
BY ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS, STAFFING WITH SKILLED
PERSONNEL, ETC. AND TRAINING OF INSPECTORS. THE
SITUATION IS AS FOLLOWS AS OF JUNE 30, 1974. THE
SAFEGUARDS DEPT HAS 101 SLOTS FOR SPECIALISTS OF
WHICH ONLY 65 HAVE BEEN FILLED; AND 36 REMAIN VACANT.

OVER A YEAR AGO A SOVIET TEAM ACTIVELY ANALYZED
THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS DEPT AND FOUND SIGNIFICANT

FAULTS IN TIS PRACTICAL WORK AD REPORTED ITS FINDINGS TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND TO THE HEAD OF SAFEGUARDS DEPT. AS YOU KNOW, A US TEAM DID AN ANALOGOUS STUDY.

ONE YEAR LATER, THE SITUATION IN THAT DEPT IS NOT BETTER BUT WORSE. THERE ARE INCREASED TENSIONS BETWEEN SECTION HEADS AND THE TOP, AND CONTRADICTIONARY PROPOSALS ARE BEING APPLIED.

AS A RESULT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL CALLED A GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL HIGH-LEVEL EXPERTS TO VIENNA IN FEBRUARY, 1974 TO WORK OUT RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SAFEGUARDS DEPT.

TO GET A CLEARER PICTURE, LET ME QUOTE SOME OF THE NAMES OF EXPERTS:

ALBA ANDRAD - MEXICO

ANDRZEJEWSKI - PLAND

GLENNON - USA

KOCH - DENMARK

MATSUI - JAPAN

MOROKHOV (SIC) - USSR

TRIVEDIA - INDIA

AS YOU CAN SEE THIS WAS A HIGH-LEVEL AND VERY COMPETENT GROUP AND IF SUBMITTED ITS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL. THE FAULT THERE IS NOT IN THE STRUCTURE
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BUT DUE TO LACK OF COORDINATION OF WORK BETWEEN DEPT HEADS AND THE DIVISION. THE GROUP RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION BUT NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE. IN FACT, THE FRICTIONS AND TENSIONS ARE MORE ACUTE THAN EVER BEFORE AND ARE SPILLING BEYOND THE AGENCY SECRETARIAT.

TO SAVE MONEY, THE SAFEGUARDS DEPT RESTRICTED HIRING AND TRAINING OF INSPECTORS. THIS RESULTED IN A TENDENCY TO DELAY, ESPECIALLY IN DELAYS TO NEGOTIATE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. THE DEPT IS ALSO BEHIND ON AN AUTOMATED SYSTEM OF DATA PROCESSING AND IN THE PREPARATION OF A SAFEGUARDS MANUAL FOR UNIFORM ACTIVITIES OF INSPECTORS. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OPERATIONS DIVISION ARE FROM OPTIONAL.

THE PERSONNEL HIRING POLICY SHOWS AN UNSATISFACTORY DISTRIBUTION OF THE 65 SLOTS: 30 OF THEM ARE FILLED BY PEOPLE FROM NON-NPT COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL, 1 DIRECTOR OF A DIVISION AND 3 SECTION HEADS. I STRESS, THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SECTION HAS ONLY 1 OUT OF 3 EMPLOYEES WHO IS FROM AN NPT COUNTRY, NAMELY, AUSTRIA.

IN THE OTHER SECTION TWO SLOTS OUT OF 11 ARE OCCUPIED BY NIGERIA AND ROMANIA. MOST IMPORTANT OF

ALL, THE HEAD OF ACCOUNTING IS FROM ARGENTINA. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE OPPONENTS OF NPT ARE HARDLY IN FAVOR OF A SUCCESSFUL VERIFICATION SYSTEM

IN OUR VIEW, URGENT MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN TO CORRECT THIS UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION AND TO STAFF THE SAFEGUARDS DEPT AND HIGHER POSTS WITH PEOPLE FROM COUNTRIES WHICH ARE ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF THE NPT, NOT ITS OPPONENTS SUCH AS ARGENTINA. WITHOUT GOING INTO FURTHER DETAILS OF DEPLORABLE ACTIVITIES OF THE SAFEGUARDS DEPARTMENT, AND THERE ARE MANY IN THIS REPORT I AM READING FROM, I NOTE THAT WHATEVER MEASURES WE MIGHT AGREE ON AT THE EXPORTERS' CONFERENCE, I WOULD BE THE IAEA THAT WOULD HAVE TO CARRY OUT THE APPLICATION OF CONTROL. THE UNSATISFACTORY ACTIVITIES OF THIS MACHINERY MAY REDUCE TO NAUGHT OUR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.

THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED MEASURES COULD CONTRIBUTE
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TO INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS DEPT:

(1) TO DETERMINE AND TO ALLOCATE NECESSARY FUNDS TO THE SAFEGUARDS DEPT FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES.

(2) TO DETERMINE THE NECESSARY NUMBER OF QUALIFIED STAFF AND TO STAFF THE DEPARTMENT FULLY WITH HIGHLY SKILLED PERSONS AT BOTH LOWER AND UPPER ECHELONS.

(3) TO INTRODUCE THIS STAFFING OF THE SAFEGUARDS DEPT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF NPT SUPPORTERS WHICH WOULD INFLUENCE THE WORK IN THE NECESSARY DIRECTION.

(4) PERIODIC REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF DEPOSITORY STATES, THE US,

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O 061310Z NOV 74
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EXDIS

USSR AND UK IN ORDER TO HAVE CLEARER PICTURE OF
STATE OF AFFAIRS.

(5) SENIOR STAFF SHOULD PAY MORE SERIOUS
ATTENTION TO TRAINING OF INSPECTORS.

(6) WORK SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED ON TECHNICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF SAFEGUARDS IN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE
IAEA.

(7) A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS
SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO DISCUSS PROVISION OF
EFFECTIVE CONTROL.S

(8) THE DIRECTOR GENERAL'S ATTENTION SHOULD
BE DRAWN TO THE UNSATISFACTORY WORK OF THE SAFEGUARDS
DEPT AND TO HIS PERSONAL DISINTERESTED ATTITUDE
TOWARDS THIS DEPARTMENT.

MR. AMBASSADOR, I COULD TALK A GREAT DEAL ABOUT
THESE MATTERS AND DR. SHMELOV, WHO HAS WORKED IN
THIS FIELD FOR MANY YEARS AND IS A TRUE EXPERT,
COULD LECTURE ON THIS ISSUE FOR A WHOLE DAY, BUT
MY PRESENTATION IS SUFFICIENT TO DESCRIBE THE
SERIOUS SITUATION WHICH EXISTS IN THE FIELD OF
CONTROL. MANY MEASURES COULD BE TAKEN AND APPROVED,
BUT THE BURDEN OF IMPLEMENTATION WILL LIE WITH THE
IAEA AND WE OUGHT TO BE CONCERNED WITH THE STATE
OF AFFAIRS IN THAT DEPARTMENT IN THIS RESPECT.

STOESSEL: THANK YOU, MR. MINISTER FOR A VERY
USEFUL PRESENTATION. WE ARE AWARE OF SOME OF THE
PROBLEMS THAT YOU HAVE MENTIONED IN THE IAEA, AND, AS
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WE HAVE SAID EARLIER, WE AGREE ON THE NEED TO IMPROVE
AND STRENGTHEN THE IAEA AND ALSO TO IMPROVE ITS
FUNDING AND STAFF. AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, WE ARE
ALSO INTERESTED IN A BROADER RANGE OF ISSUES ON
NON-PROLIFERATION AND WE ANTICIPATE HAVING FURTHER
DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU ON THESE TOPICS. HOWEVER, I
AM NOT IN A POSITION AT THIS TIME TO OFFER ANY
COMMENTS ON THE TIMING OR VENUES FOR THESE BILATERAL
TALKS. I WANT TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SMALL
CONFERENCE OF KEY EXPORTERS WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED
AND THE NEED FOR AN EARLY DECISION SO THAT WE CAN

PROCEED WITH DETAILED PLANNING FOR IT. IN THAT REGARD I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REPORTING TO YOUR GOVERNMENT ON OUR IDEAS AND WE WILL OF COURSE BE IN TOUCH DURING OUR RECESS ON ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS ON THESE MATTERS.

MOROKHOV: THANK YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR. I WILL REPORT ABOUT YOUR PROPOSAL AND ABOUT YOUR ATTITUDE ON OURS.

UNLESS, YOU HAVE FURTHER PRESENTATIONS TO MAKE, I PROPOSE THAT THIS BE OUR LAST MEETING PRIOR TO RECESS SINCE THE DECISIONS THAT MUST BE TAKEN WILL TAKE TIME. I THINK THAT DURING THESE DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD A VERY USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE OUR VIEWS ON YOUR DOCUMENT AND WE HAVE HAD A WELCOME CHANCE TO DESCRIBE TO THE AMERICAN SIDE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THOSE POINTS ON THE AGENDA WHICH WE PRESENTED FOR DISCUSSION. WE HOPE THAT THIS WILL HELP THE AMERICAN SIDE IN WORKING OUT ITS POSITION ON ALL THESE MATERS.

STOESSEL: I AGREE THAT THESE HAVE BEEN VERY USEFUL TALKS AND THAT THIS COULD BE OUR LAST MEETING, BUT WE WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR A BRIEF MEETING EARLY TOMORROW AFTERNOON IF YOU THINK YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE BY THEN. I WOULD BE USEFUL TO COMPLETE THIS ITEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IT WOULD HELP MR. MARCUM IN WORKING OUT HIS TRAVEL PLANS.

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MOROKHOV: I UNDERSTAND, MR. AMBASSADOR. WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO HAVE MR. MARCUM STAY AS LONG AS HE WISHES, BUT I DO NOT THINK IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO HAVE A DECISION BY TOMORROW. EVERYONE IS VERY BUSY PLANNING FOR VLADIVOSTOK, SO THIS QUESTION WILL TAKE AT LEAST ONE WEEK FOR A DECISION. ONE AGAIN I WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT WE HAVE HAD A VERY USEFUL EXCHANGE. I WOULD LIKE TO OBSERVE THAT AS TO MY PERSONAL ATTITUDE AND THAT OF MY COLLEAGUES IN REGARD TO YOUR CONFERENCE, IT IS POSITIVE, BUT A DECISION WILL HAVE TO DEPEND ON OTHER FACTORS AS WELL.

END QUOTE.

2. MEETING ADJOURNED.

3. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH MARCUM, AT LUNCH AND AFTER MEETING, TIMERBAEV ASKED WHEN THE EXPORTER'S

CONFERENCE WOULD BE HELD. MARCUM ANSWERED THAT NATURALLY IT WOULD EPEND ON VIEWS OF OTHER KEY EXPORTERS BUT THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE URGENCY AND WOULD BE HELD ASAP AND ASKED IF TIMERBAEV HAD ANY PREFERENCE. CITING VACATION PLANS, ETC., TIMERBAEV EXPRESSED PERSONAL PREFERENCE FOR AFTER THE FIRST OF JANUARY FOR BOTH CONFERENCE AND RESUMPTION OF TTB/PNE TALKS. HE STATED THAT THE SOVIET APPROACH ON BROAD DISCUSSIONS REPRESENTED A STRONG PERSONAL COMMITMENT AND STTRESSED THAT I WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF WE COULD ESTABLISH PROCEDURE FOR REGULAR, PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS ON A NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY, OCCASIONALLY INCLUDING THE UK. HE SUGGESTED THAT THESE MIGHT BE AT THE STOESSEL-MOROKHOV LEVEL, AND THAT WHEN IMPORTANT ACTIONS WERE IDENTIFIED SUCH AS THE EXPORTER'S CONFERENCE, WE COULD PURSUE THEM ON AN APPROPRIATE MULTILATERAL BASIS. HE OFFERED SEVERAL COMMENTS ON IAEA PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED THAT ONE APPROACH TO RESOLVE CONFLICT BETWEEN DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND HEAD OF SAFEGUARDS DEPARTMENT WOULD BE TO GIVE EKLUND BOTH JOBS. STOESSEL

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